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Abstract 
One of the more exotic and mysterious features of Leibniz’s later philosophical writings is 
the harmony between the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of grace. In this paper I show 
that this harmony is not a single doctrine, but rather a compilation of two doctrines, namely 
(1) that the order of nature makes possible the rewards and punishments of rational souls, and 
(2) that the rewards and punishments of rational souls are administered naturally. I argue that 
the harmony is best considered as Leibniz’s distinctive collation, development, and 
rebranding of these doctrines, which were not themselves unique to Leibniz, nor uncommon 
in the seventeenth century. There follows a detailed examination of various concrete 
examples of the harmony in operation, from which I show that it is essentially the 
culmination of Leibniz’s lifelong thinking about divine justice. 
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1 Introduction 
In his mature philosophy, Leibniz identifies no fewer than three harmonies embedded into 
creation: that between minds and bodies, that between efficient causes and final causes, and 
that between the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of grace.1 The first holds that minds and 
bodies do not interact but that their respective states nevertheless conspire through the 
operation of their own distinct laws.2 The second holds that any natural effect can be equally 
well explained with reference to teleological laws (and hence final causes) as to mechanistic 
laws (and efficient causes), even though the two sets of laws (and causes) do not overlap or 
                                                 
1 In §46 of the Causa Dei (1710), Leibniz identifies the three harmonies as “formal causes, or souls, with 
material causes, or bodies; efficient or natural causes with final or moral causes; the kingdom of grace with the 
kingdom of nature”. G VI, 446. All the translations of Leibniz’s writings in this paper are mine. Where possible, 
I have cited a published translation that has informed my own. 
2 See for example “A new system on the nature and the communication of substances” (1695), G IV, 477-
487/SLT 68-77. 
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interfere.3 And the third holds that there is a concord between God’s roles as architect of the 
physical universe, and his role as monarch of the moral universe of minds, such that his plans 
for minds are effected through the order of nature.4 Each and every one of the realms in these 
three harmonies is inviolable, and so is not affected or influenced by whatever happens in its 
counterpart, but because of God’s masterful organization at the outset to make them conspire, 
it will look to us as if there is influence between them. The decision to embed so many 
harmonies into creation is an upshot of God’s perfect wisdom, which is irresistibly drawn to 
harmony.5 According to Leibniz, “supreme wisdom and goodness can act only with a perfect 
harmony”,6 and consequently “everything God does is harmonious to perfection”.7 This 
ensures that if there is an aspect of creation which could be made harmonious, then God will 
make it so.8 
 Of the three harmonies recognized by Leibniz, that between the kingdoms of nature 
and grace is the one most neglected by commentators. Writings of a good length on it are few 
and far between; the most detailed to date is a book chapter written in 1973 by Christian 
Zangger, though this omits much that is important.9 More often, the harmony is mentioned in 
commentators’ works only in passing, usually in a handful of pages, and sometimes even 
less.10 Such brief treatments inevitably overlook many of the aspects or facets of this 
harmony. As one of Leibniz’s signature doctrines, a detailed elucidation of this harmony is 
long overdue, and will be the focus of this paper. In what follows I aim to establish two main 
points. First, through an elucidation of this harmony in section 2, I show that it is best 
                                                 
3 See for example “Tentamen anagogicum” (c. 1696), G VII, 290-297/L 477-484. 
4 Hence there is a “harmony between the physical kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of grace; that is, 
between God as architect of the machine of the universe, and God considered as monarch of the divine city of 
minds”. Monadology (1714) G VI, 622/LM 32. 
5 Leibniz writes in 1671: “since God is the most perfect mind, it is impossible that he is not affected by the most 
perfect harmony”. Letter to Magnus Wedderkopf (May 1671), A II 1, 186/L146. 
6 Principles of Nature and Grace (1714), G VI, 604/LM 275. 
7 Theodicy (1710), G VI, 142/H 162. 
8 Hence: “All is connected in nature; and if a skilled artisan, an engineer, an architect, a wise politician often 
makes one and the same thing serve several ends, if he kills two birds with one stone, when that can be done 
conveniently, it may be said that God, whose wisdom and power are perfect, does so always.” G VI, 169/H 189. 
In another text, Leibniz claims that God “produces infinite harmonies”, though whether this should be taken 
literally is unclear. See his letter to Christian Wolff (18 May 1715) in W 171/AG 233. 
9 Zangger 1973, 39-49. Worth noting here also is Phemister 2003, though this paper is concerned more with the 
composition of the two kingdoms rather than the harmony between them, about which very little is said. 
10 The best of these is Adams 1994, 82-85. 
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considered as Leibniz’s collation, development, and rebranding of two doctrines that were by 
no means uncommon in his day, both of which concern the natural distribution of rewards 
and punishments. Second, from a detailed examination of various concrete examples of the 
harmony in section 3, I show that the harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace is 
essentially the culmination of Leibniz’s lifelong thinking about divine justice, since the 
harmony is concerned exclusively with the dispensation of rewards and punishments, 
throughout this life and the next, using natural means alone. To bolster that claim, I consider 
a Leibnizian doctrine that one might think should fall under the harmony, but which 
apparently does not, namely the natural distribution of grace. This might be thought 
surprising, in that it means Leibniz’s harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace 
actually has nothing to do with grace, in spite of its name. I conclude by speculating on why 
Leibniz apparently excluded grace from this harmony. 
 
 
2 The harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace 
References to the harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace are commonly found in 
Leibniz’s later writings; as far as I have been able to determine, Leibniz first refers to it in a 
letter written in June 1710.11 In a text written less than a year before that, in July 1709, 
Leibniz identifies only two parallelisms, or harmonies: the one between body and soul, and 
the other between the kingdom of efficient causes and the kingdom of final causes.12 This 
suggests that the identification of the third parallelism, between the kingdoms of nature and 
grace, was made either in the second half of 1709 or in the first half of 1710. This is the time 
in which Leibniz was completing the Theodicy, the first edition of which was published in the 
last months of 1710. The harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace makes several 
appearances in that book, and then features in many of Leibniz’s most important 
philosophical writings thereafter, such as the Monadology (1714) and the Principles of 
Nature and Grace (1714). Yet as we shall see as we proceed, the “harmony between the 
kingdoms of nature and grace” is a compilation of two distinct but related doctrines, both of 
which had been present in Leibniz’s writings prior to 1709/10. Consequently, this particular 
harmony is best viewed as the outcome of a restructuring and rebranding exercise that 
                                                 
11 To Wagner (4 June 1710), in D II:1, 226-230. 
12 See “Animadversiones circa assertiones aliquas theorie medicae verae Clar. Stahlii” (24 July 1709), D II:2, 
133. 
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Leibniz undertook in 1709/10 rather than the introduction into his philosophy of something 
new.13 
 What, then, are these constitutive doctrines? Or to put it another way, what does the 
harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace actually involve? In his writings on the 
subject, Leibniz takes the harmony to comprise the following two doctrines: 
 
HNG1: That the order of nature makes possible the rewards and punishments of 
rational souls (by making all souls naturally indestructible, and in addition ensuring 
that rational souls will retain their memory and personality) 
HNG2: That the rewards and punishments of rational souls are administered 
naturally, such that each act of virtue or vice naturally brings about its own reward or 
punishment 
 
Although complementary, the two doctrines are logically independent, in that it is perfectly 
possible to accept either one while rejecting the other, and in fact it is likely that Leibniz 
came to endorse them at different times in his career: as we shall see, HNG1 is in place by the 
mid-1680s, and HNG2 by the mid-1690s. Nevertheless, what Leibniz does in 1709 or 1710 is 
fuse the two complementary doctrines into a stable compound, and calls it the harmony 
between the kingdoms of nature and grace. Curiously, however, even when he has done this, 
he continues to treat the elements of this compound in isolation, for when he discusses the 
harmony between the two kingdoms he typically goes on to discuss either HNG1 or HNG2, 
but not both together. This is the distribution of the two doctrines across the principal works 
in which the harmony is discussed:14 
 
 
Text Doctrine endorsed as example of harmony 
between the kingdoms of nature and grace 
                                                 
13 In a text from 1694, Leibniz makes passing reference to the “moral kingdom of minds and the mechanical 
kingdom of bodies”, though he does not explain what he means by these terms, nor does he associate any 
doctrines with them. See Leibniz’s notes on Seder Olam (1694), unpublished manuscript held in the Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek, shelf mark LH I, V, 2, Bl. 22. A deleted passage reveals that he originally 
described the “moral kingdom of minds” as “the kingdom of reason and minds”. 
14 The same is true of the minor works in which the harmony of the kingdoms of nature and grace is discussed, 
i.e. letters; in each case, Leibniz discusses HNG1 or HNG2 but not both. 
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On the souls of men and beasts (1710) HNG1 
Theodicy (1710) HNG1, HNG2 
Causa Dei (1710) HNG2 
Metaphysical consequences of the principle of 
reason (1712) 
HNG1 
Monadology (1714) HNG2 
Principles of nature and grace (1714) HNG2 
 
While the Theodicy looks to be an exception, in fact it is not. It is a lengthy work, and Leibniz 
returns to the harmony between the two kingdoms numerous times during the course of it, 
and each time he does so he discusses either HNG1 or HNG2, but not both together. I have 
no explanation for why Leibniz would keep them separate, especially since the two doctrines 
are clearly connected. 
 We turn now to an examination of the two doctrines. 
 
2.1 HNGI. Natural indestructibility and the immortality of rational souls 
We begin with the first of the two, which holds that the order of nature makes possible the 
rewards and punishments of rational souls. This claim can be found in Leibniz’s so-called 
“middle period”. For example, in a letter to Arnauld from 1687, Leibniz writes: 
 
And one may truly be assured that the whole universe has been made only to contribute to the 
ornament and goodness of this City of God. This is why everything is arranged in such a way 
that the laws of force, or purely material laws, conspire in all the universe to carry out the 
laws of justice or of love, that nothing can harm souls, which are in God’s hand, and that 
everything must work for the greatest good of those who love him. This is why minds must 
preserve their personalities and their moral qualities, in order that the City of God loses no 
one. It must be that they preserve in particular a kind of reminiscence, or consciousness, or 
the power to know what they are, upon which all their morality, penalties, and punishments 
depend.15 
 
The claim here was subsequently repeated in many of Leibniz’s writings, and in 1710 he 
identified it as an instance of the harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace: 
 
                                                 
15 To Arnauld (9 October 1687), A II 2, 257-258/L 347, cf. A II 2, 260/L348. 
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Finally, man is assigned by God to a much higher end, namely, to a society with him; and 
therefore (on account of the harmony of the kingdoms of nature and grace) it has been 
established that human souls are preserved together with some organic body, not only in the 
manner of beasts, which are perhaps stupefied for a time after death, but in a more noble way, 
so that they retain sensation and consciousness and are capable of punishment and reward.16 
 
The seventeenth century was awash with philosophers who argued that the soul was naturally 
immortal, most famously Descartes in the Meditations,17 but also many of those who 
followed him, such as Malebranche,18 and Le Grand.19 The most common tactic was to stress 
that the soul is lacking in extension, and is therefore inherently indivisible, and as such not 
subject to dissolution or corruption. Because of this, it was argued, the only means of 
destroying an indivisible thing would be by annihilation, that is, by actually deleting it from 
existence, but as this would be a supernatural process of destruction, rather than a natural 
one, it must therefore be the case that souls are immortal by nature. Despite the popularity of 
this argument among his contemporaries, Leibniz frequently complained that it only yields 
the conclusion that souls are naturally indestructible.20 True immortality, he insisted, requires 
not just the preservation of our substance: it also requires the preservation of our person.21 
Hence a truly immortal soul will endure forever, retaining its memory and its personality. 
Animal souls, which do not retain these things, can be said to be indestructible (as are all 
souls),22 but not immortal (a privilege granted only to rational souls): 
 
I think that beasts have an incorporeal soul, and that it will not perish, although it does not 
deserve to be called immortal, because it does not retain the same personality, as does a 
human soul, which preserves knowledge of deeds done, that is, its own memory, and 
therefore is capable of rewards and punishments beyond this life.23 
 
                                                 
16 “On the souls of men and beasts” (1710), G VII, 332/SLT 67. 
17 See Descartes 1984, 10. 
18 Malebranche 1997b, 274. 
19 Le Grand 1678, 512. 
20 See for example A II 1, 779-780. 
21 See “Discourse on Metaphysics” (1686), A VI 4, 1584/L 326. 
22 The difference between animal souls and human souls, Leibniz explains to one correspondent, is that while 
both are “physically immortal”, only the latter are “morally immortal”. To Kortholt (17 June 1712), D V, 320. 
23 To Kortholt (15 March 1713), D V, 320-321. 
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Humans are members of God’s moral society (the “City of God”), and as such are morally 
accountable for what they do. Justice demands that they be rewarded or punished accordingly 
for their good and bad actions, and since this tends not happen in this life (in which the good 
often suffer and the wicked often prosper), human existence must continue after this life in 
order that the balance of reward or punishment due may be settled. But for true justice to be 
done it is not enough that humans continue to exist after this life: they must also retain their 
memory and their personality. And according to Leibniz, this all-important preservation of 
memory and personality does occur, and occurs naturally, without any intervention from 
God. So here, the kingdom of nature harmonizes with that of grace, with the former 
preserving the very things whose preservation is required by the latter:  
 
But since nature gradually dispels confusions, then that which we imagine to be death cannot 
be perpetual. Moreover, rational substances alone preserve not only their own individuality 
but also their personality, retaining or recovering consciousness of themselves, so that they 
can be citizens in the city of God, capable of reward and punishment. Thus in their case, the 
kingdom of nature serves the kingdom of grace.24 
 
Leibniz does not explain how memory and/or personality is naturally preserved, but arguably 
does not need to do so since he has strong a priori reasons for thinking that there is such an 
explanation (namely that God’s wisdom will instantiate a harmony between the kingdoms of 
nature and grace, which requires the natural preservation of the memory and personality of 
human souls), so consequently he knows that there must be such an explanation even if the 
detail of it lies out of reach.25 
 
2.2 HNG2: The natural distribution of punishment and reward 
It goes without saying that while the preservation of human beings, personality and all, makes 
possible the future dispensation of rewards and punishments, it does not itself entail that the 
dispensation will actually occur, or determine how rewards and punishments will be 
dispensed if they are dispensed. Such concerns were addressed in the second doctrine that 
was encompassed within Leibniz’s harmony between the two kingdoms; this doctrine insists 
that the rewards and punishments of rational souls are administered naturally, such that each 
act of virtue or vice naturally brings about its own reward or punishment. The following 
                                                 
24 “Metaphysical consequences of the principle of reason” (1712), C 16/P 177. 
25 Leibniz reasons in precisely this way; see his letter to Sophie (29 November 1707), K IX, 287-288/LTS 363. 
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passage, from the essay Principles of Nature and Grace (1714), is a typical summary of this 
doctrine: 
 
all minds, whether of men or genies [...] are [...] members of the City of God, that is, the most 
perfect state, formed and governed by the greatest and best of monarchs, in which there is no 
crime without punishment, no good actions without proportionate reward, and finally as much 
virtue and happiness as is possible. And this comes to pass not by any disruption of nature, as 
if what God has in store for souls might disturb the laws of bodies, but by the very order of 
natural things, in virtue of the harmony pre-established from all time between the kingdoms 
of nature and grace, between God as architect and God as monarch, in such a way that nature 
itself leads to grace, and grace perfects nature by making use of it.26 
 
There are two distinct claims here: 
 
(a) That every virtuous act will be rewarded and every sinful act punished 
(b) That rewards and punishments will be administered naturally 
 
Leibniz sometimes makes both claims together when discussing the harmony of the two 
kingdoms, although strictly speaking only (b) is a consequence of this harmony (while (a) is a 
consequence of God’s perfect justice). In some writings Leibniz endorses (a) without 
mentioning (b) at all,27 and it is likely that for a not inconsiderable part of his career he 
accepted (a) but not (b); this is unproblematic inasmuch as either claim can be accepted 
without the other. 
 The core claim of HG2, then, is that rewards and punishments will be administered 
naturally. But how are we to understand this? A number of answers seem possible: 
One possible answer is what might be termed reflexive punishment, where a sin just is 
its own punishment, for example the sin of distancing oneself from God is its own 
punishment. 
                                                 
26 G VI, 605/LM 276. 
27 For example, “Memoir for enlightened persons of good intention” (c. 1692), A IV 4, 614/R 105; Letter to 
Placcius (29 September 1697), D VI 84; “Considerations on vital principles and plastic natures” (1705), G VI, 
545/L 590. 
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A second possibility is that a sin is connected to its own punishment by a 
straightforward process of cause and effect, such that, given the prevailing laws of nature, if 
the sin occurs, then the punishment must follow. We might call this nomic punishment. 
A third possible answer is that sins naturally attract their punishment. Here the 
connection between sin and punishment is forged through the reactions of moral agents: a sin 
galvanizes or inspires such agents to mete out punishment, and thus draws down punishment 
on itself. A good illustration of this can be found in an example of Kant’s, where “a man who 
delights in annoying and vexing peaceable people at last receives a right good beating”.28 Let 
us term this agential punishment. 
Among those who have examined Leibniz’s doctrine of natural punishment, there is 
little agreement as to what it amounts to. Some commentators have claimed that Leibniz sees 
natural punishment as (exclusively) reflexive punishment,29 while others have claimed that he 
sees it as (exclusively) nomic.30 Neither camp is correct, as we shall see. It is certainly true 
that Leibniz endorsed reflexive punishment, or something very much like it, but only in one 
specific case, namely the distancing of oneself from God: 
 
But just as a man who does not know a good doctor is punished enough for that, because he 
does not get cured, so it can happen for the same reason that those who do not know the 
perfections of the divinity punish themselves, because they do not derive the assistance that 
they could expect from this knowledge.31 
 
Much more popular among commentators is the view that Leibniz’s natural punishment is 
(exclusively) nomic punishment. But those who have taken this line have struggled to 
identify examples of it in Leibniz’s writings,32 and some have even tried, without success, to 
ascertain how nomic punishment could work in Leibniz’s philosophy.33 Scholarly 
disagreements and uncertainties like those just described are usually due to a primary 
literature which is ambiguous, opaque, or lacking in detail, and there is a little of that here. 
Certainly some of Leibniz’s remarks on the natural punishment of sins do not obviously point 
                                                 
28 Kant 1996, 80. 
29 See for example Sève 1989, 120; Mormino 2009, 40ff. 
30 See, for example, Fabre 1907, 506; Broad 1975, 170; Carlin 2002, 155. 
31 Appendix to a letter to Coste (1711), G III, 415. 
32 See for example Woolhouse 2011, 118. 
33 See Carlin 2002, 143ff. 
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to any one of the methods of natural punishment just outlined over another; for example, his 
claim that “sins naturally trail their punishment after them by a kind of pre-established 
harmony”,34 could plausibly be construed in terms of reflexive, nomic, or agential 
punishment. In some writings, however, Leibniz appears to lean towards the method 
identified above as nomic punishment. For example, in the Monadology (1714) he writes: 
 
It can also be said that God as architect satisfies in every way God as legislator, and that sins 
must therefore carry their punishment with them by the order of nature, and by virtue of the 
mechanical structure of things itself, and that likewise good actions will receive their rewards 
by ways which are mechanical with regard to bodies, although this cannot and need not 
always happen immediately.35 
 
Meanwhile, in other remarks, Leibniz uses the language of attraction, which I have 
associated with agential punishment: 
 
the principle of fitness [...] has made it the case that things have been ordered in such a way 
that the bad action should bring upon itself a punishment. There are grounds to conclude, 
following the parallelism of the two kingdoms, that of final causes and that of efficient 
causes, that God has established in the universe a connection between punishment or reward, 
and between bad or good action, such that the first should always be attracted by the second, 
and that virtue and vice obtain their reward and their punishment as a result of the natural 
series of things, which contains yet another kind of pre-established harmony than that which 
is apparent in the commerce between the soul and the body. For in a word, everything God 
does is harmonious to perfection.36 
 
Leibniz in fact accepted both nomic punishment and agential punishment in his account of 
the natural punishment of sins, though demonstrating this will require a detailed examination 
of Leibniz’s doctrine of natural rewards and punishments. This task is worthwhile in its own 
right, as it will also reveal the historical dimension of Leibniz’s theodicy, a side of it that is 
often overlooked.37 It is thus to this task that we now turn. 
                                                 
34 Appendix to a letter to Coste (1711), G III, 414. 
35 G VI, 622/LM 32. 
36 G VI, 142/H 162. 
37 For example by John Hick, who erroneously takes Leibniz’s claim that ours is the best possible world to 
exclude the denouement of human history in the afterlife. See Hick 2010, 81. 
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3 Administering rewards and punishments through the order of nature 
In examining the claim that rewards and punishments are distributed naturally, we will often 
find ourselves focusing on punishments, as this is what Leibniz himself tends to do. A clue as 
to Leibniz’s inspiration for his belief that sins are naturally punished can be found in a letter 
to a correspondent in 1695: “I told you yesterday, Sir, that according to the ancients every sin 
punishes itself.”38 Unfortunately Leibniz does not say which of the ancients he has in mind, 
but certainly the idea that evil punishes itself has a rich history. Variations of this theme can 
be found in the Old and New Testaments,39 the Church Fathers,40 as well as respected secular 
authors such as Seneca.41 Yet in endorsing the notion of natural punishment, it is far from 
clear that Leibniz is simply throwing his weight behind traditional thinking. In fact, the 
doctrine as he espouses it would very likely strike many Christians as somewhat heterodox, 
even though Leibniz sometimes connects it with traditional Christian doctrines. 
  
3.1 Original sin 
This is the case with our first example of the natural punishment of sin, which is discussed in 
the Theodicy: Adam’s original sin of eating the forbidden fruit, which thereby brought 
corruption upon the whole of his posterity. Leibniz notes that the traditional account has it 
that God, justifiably annoyed by Adam’s transgression, deliberately intervened to impose 
punishment by corrupting both him and his offspring. Leibniz disagreed, insisting: 
 
There are grounds to think that the forbidden action by itself entailed these evil effects by 
virtue of a natural consequence, and that it was for that very reason, and not by a purely 
arbitrary decree, that God had forbidden it, rather as one forbids knives to children.42 
 
Leibniz’s preference for an alternative account emerges from “contemplation of divine 
wisdom [which] leads us to believe that the Kingdom of nature serves that of grace; and that 
God as Architect has done everything as befitted God considered as Monarch.”43 But while 
                                                 
38 To Baron Friedrich Boguslaus Dobrzensky (26 January 1695), Gr I, 369. 
39 See for example Jeremiah 2.19; John 5.14; Galatians 6.7. 
40 Augustine 2012, 21 (I.12.19). 
41 See Seneca 1786, 85 and 200 (letters 87 and 95). 
42 G VI, 164/H 184. 
43 G VI, 164-5/H 185. 
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Leibniz is able to draw from God’s wisdom the conclusion that Adam’s punishment was 
naturally administered, he did not think it possible to ascertain exactly how: “We do not 
sufficiently know the nature of the forbidden fruit, or that of the action, or its effects, to judge 
the detail of the matter.”44 In his discussion of the natural transmission of original sin Leibniz 
mentions only Robert Fludd’s suggestion that the fruit eaten by Adam contained a poison 
(such a level of detail is unobtainable, Leibniz complains in response),45 but his own view is 
closer to that advanced by two of the early Church Fathers, namely Tertullian and Augustine. 
Tertullian endorsed a version of traducianism which held that an individual inherits both her 
soul and body from her parents, as well as her soul’s spiritual characteristics;46 as such, Adam 
transmits not only a body and soul to each of his offspring, but also his sin and corruption as 
well, and his offspring in turn transmit these things to their offspring, and so on. A similar 
story is told by Augustine, who held that all human beings were literally present in Adam 
when he sinned, and therefore participated in the sin and in the penalty of corruption that God 
imposed in response.47 Leibniz’s mechanism of choice for the natural transmission of original 
sin was the cognate doctrine of preformation. This holds that all animals (humans included) 
that were to develop throughout the course of the universe began as seeds that were present in 
the semen of the very first generation of the species.48 Thus Adam, as the first human, 
contained the seeds of every subsequent human being (barring Eve!). Each of these seeds 
contained not just a miniature version of a human body that would grow and develop once 
conception had taken place, but also its soul. And when Adam fell, all of the souls inside of 
him were tainted, as if by an inherited disease. In fact, Leibniz uses the language of 
“infection” when describing the events in the Causa Dei (1710):  
 
There follows from the fall of the first parents the propagation of the infection, which reached 
into the souls of their descendants. This does not seem to be able to be explained more 
conveniently than by supposing that the souls of these descendants were already infected in 
Adam.49 
 
                                                 
44 G VI, 165/H 185. The claim can also be found in a letter to Thomas Burnett (18 October 1712), G III, 324. 
45 See Otreb 1617. 
46 See Tertullian 1873, 25 and 40. 
47 See Augustine 1956, II.15. 
48 For more on Leibniz’s preformationism, see Smith 2011, especially chapters 5 and 6. 
49 G VI, 451. 
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Malebranche had reached a similar view some years earlier, arguing that the corruption to 
Adam’s brain was duplicated in the embryonic brains of his progeny inside him, who in turn 
passed it on to their progeny, and thus was original sin transmitted through the normal 
process of generation, like an undesirable trait that has been bred into a population with no 
natural means of breeding it out.50 In contrast to this, Leibniz characterized original sin as 
akin to an addiction to evil which is naturally transmitted from generation to generation as 
though it were some impossible-to-treat infection.51 And this, Leibniz believed, was an 
instance of nature dovetailing with grace, for “Original sin [...] is not a simple penalty for the 
first sin; it is a natural consequence thereof.”52 It is thus an example of nomic punishment. 
 
3.2 The great flood, and the final conflagration 
As indeed is our next example of the natural punishment of sins, which can be found in the 
Monadology: 
 
This harmony [between the kingdoms of nature and grace] means that things lead to grace by 
the very ways of nature, and that for example this globe must be destroyed and repaired by 
natural ways at the times the government of minds demand it for the punishment of some and 
the reward of others.53 
 
                                                 
50 See Malebranche 1997b, 120 and 582; and 1997a, 208 (section XI.X). 
51 While Leibniz does consider the corruption of original sin to be a punishment on Adam’s progeny, he does 
not consider it to be a punishment worthy of damnation: “I would not venture to assert that original sin without 
an accompanying actual sin (in other words, in those who die before they attain the use of reason) is sufficient 
for damnation, which some have thought.” G III, 36. 
52 G VI, 180/H 200. Nicholas Jolley has argued that Leibniz “seems to show some embarrassment in his 
treatment” of the Fall, and “betrays discomfort whenever the occasion calls for him to take a stand on the issue 
of human corruption through original sin”. Jolley 2014, 62. My own impression, which does not differ much if 
at all from Jolley’s, is that Leibniz is only troubled by some of the harsher interpretations of the moral 
repercussions of the Fall, rather than by the event itself. Certainly he recoils from the thought that, as a result of 
the Fall, the majority of humans (along with all unbaptized infants) will be damned, and tackles it head-on in the 
Theodicy. Nevertheless, in spite of his reservations about the harshness of the Fall’s moral consequences for the 
human race, Leibniz never casts doubt on the event itself, e.g. by treating it allegorically rather than literally, 
and there is little doubt that he did believe in Adam and Eve, that they were the progenitors of the entire human 
race, that their sin had negative repercussions for all future humans etc. 
53 G VI, 622/LM 32. 
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Although Leibniz does not mention either explicitly, the two most likely candidates for the 
planet-wide destructions mentioned here are (a) the biblical flood described in Genesis 6-9, 
and (b) the final destruction of the Earth prior to the Last Judgment, following which the 
Earth will be restored so that the blessed may enjoy eternal life under Christ’s rule.54 
Leibniz’s geological work affords a good idea of how he envisaged the world being naturally 
destroyed and repaired. In the Protogaea (1691-1693), for example, Leibniz describes the 
formation of the Earth from an initial molten ball of fire, and the subsequent upheavals that 
occurred as it cooled, including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and great floods (of which 
the biblical flood was just one) of such magnitude that they submerged almost the entire 
surface of the Earth. But the Protogaea reveals not only that Leibniz believed that the deluges 
responsible for such great floods had occurred entirely through natural processes, but also 
that it was through natural processes alone that the waters had drained away each time.55 In 
early modern times, naturalistic accounts of the great flood, and of the Earth’s recovery from 
it, were not uncommon, and Leibniz’s theory would not have looked out of place alongside 
those developed by the theologian Thomas Burnet,56 and the naturalist John Ray.57 Although 
each had a different view as to the mechanism responsible for the flood, they all considered 
the flood to be a natural event as well as a divine punishment for the sins of mankind, though 
in Burnet and Ray the harmony between the natural and the moral was more often insinuated 
than explicitly stated. Leibniz was a keen reader of works of sacred history, and knew the 
work of both Burnet and Ray. Yet it is just as likely that Leibniz’s inspiration was 
Malebranche, even though the Frenchman ultimately could not bring himself to accept the 
naturalistic account of the flood that Leibniz so readily endorsed. In his Meditations 
chrestiennes (1683), Malebranche raised the possibility that the general laws of nature and 
the general laws of grace might work together, in the sense that the former bring to pass a 
natural event at the very point in which the latter morally require it. The two examples he 
considered were, first, that the laws of nature may have brought about the universal flood at 
                                                 
54 Interestingly, scholars have tended to interpret Leibniz as referring to exclusively one or the other. Daniel 
Garber construes Leibniz’s remarks as referring to the universal flood, while Anthony Savile construes them as 
relating to the destruction of the Earth prior to the Last Judgment. However it is worth noting Leibniz’s use of 
the plural, which suggests that he is thinking of more than one cataclysmic event. See Garber 1995, 328;  Savile 
2000, 224. 
55 See Protogaea (1691-1693), CW 15-19. 
56 Burnet 1681, book 1. 
57 Ray 1692, 63ff. 
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the very point at which the corruption of the human race warranted its own destruction,58 and 
second, that the fire which rages at the centre of the Earth may eventually increase and spill 
out to cause a planet-wide conflagration at the very time at which the level of human 
corruption requires such a destruction at the end of days.59 Yet almost as soon as the 
suggestions are raised, Malebranche distances himself from them, arguing that one can go too 
far in diminishing the number of miracles in the universe.60 Leibniz, presumably, would have 
to disagree, since the fewer the number of miracles, i.e. direct divine interventions, the 
greater the harmony must be between the kingdoms of nature and grace, and as harmony is 
evidence of divine wisdom, the greater the harmony, the more creation befits God’s supreme 
wisdom. 
 
3.3 Individual rewards and punishments 
It is notable that the specific examples of natural punishment considered thus far share two 
common features: (1) they all relate to key Christian doctrines, as related in various books of 
Scripture, and (2) they all relate to humans collectively. But for Leibniz, the harmony 
between the kingdoms of nature and grace encompasses not just landmark events in human 
history such as these, but also many particular events of each and every individual’s life. This 
much follows from his insistence that, in the harmony between the two kingdoms, every sin is 
naturally punished, and every virtuous act naturally rewarded: 
 
[In the City of God] there is no crime without punishment, no good actions without 
proportionate reward, and finally as much virtue and happiness as is possible. And this comes 
to pass not by any disruption of nature, as if what God has in store for souls might disturb the 
laws of bodies, but by the very order of natural things, in virtue of the harmony pre-
established from all time between the kingdoms of nature and grace, between God as architect 
and God as monarch, in such a way that nature itself leads to grace, and grace perfects nature 
by making use of it.61 
 
Now as noted earlier, when Leibniz says that sins are punished naturally, as he does here, it is 
common to interpret him as endorsing a form of nomic punishment. This is the thinking 
                                                 
58 Malebranche 1683, 114-115. 
59 Malebranche 1683, 116. 
60 Malebranche 1683, 117. 
61 G VI, 605/LM 276. 
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behind Roger Woolhouse’s tentative suggestion that “Conceivably he [Leibniz] has in mind 
that an intemperate life tends naturally (though not inevitably) to unhappy pains of ill health, 
but what he means is not spelt out.”62 Certainly, ideas very similar to this were in circulation 
in Leibniz’s day, and known to him. For example, John Toland argued that poverty and scorn 
are the natural effects of wastefulness, and may thereby be deemed the natural punishment 
for this sin; likewise, according to Toland, the sin of drunkenness has a number of natural 
effects which may be considered its punishment, namely: feeling unwell, the inability to carry 
out one’s normal affairs, public disgrace, infamy etc.63 It is not uncommon to find Leibniz’s 
own doctrine of natural punishment depicted (or even caricatured) in very similar ways. For 
example, in Voltaire’s Candide, the Leibnizian character Pangloss contracts the pox from a 
dalliance with Paquette,64 which is very naturally read as Pangloss’ (nomically-executed) 
punishment for giving in to his lusts. Now Leibniz was not entirely averse to identifying a 
direct, causal link between sin and its punishment: we have already encountered his view that 
there was such a link between Adam’s transgression and the unfortunate effects of it being 
transmitted to his posterity, and we shall see a further example in due course. But Leibniz did 
not think that many sins were punished in this way. In fact, Leibniz often notes (and 
complains) that rewards and punishments are all too often left to the future life,65 which 
suggests that whatever the connection between sins and their punishments, it is often not as 
direct and immediate as in classic examples of nomic punishment such as a hangover directly 
caused by drunkenness. Indeed, Leibniz even claims that naturally-rewarded good actions 
and naturally-punished bad actions are more common in the afterlife than in this life: “During 
the future life especially, all sins are such that they punish themselves, and all good deeds are 
such that they bring about their own reward.”66 
By locating much of the process of naturally-administered rewards and punishments 
in the afterlife, Leibniz would seem to have pushed it out of epistemological reach. He was 
certainly of the view that “the status of intermediate souls is an obscure matter, and one not 
                                                 
62 Woolhouse 2011, 118. 
63 See “Parallele entre la raison originale ou la loy de la nature” (after 1704), Gr I, 53-54. This text survives only 
because Leibniz made a copy of it. 
64 See Voltaire 2006, 10. 
65 See for example Gr I, 372/SLT 205. Leibniz even claims that “it was possible for men to be atheists before 
revelation, since the divinity does not always avenge itself in this life”. To Bierling (March 1713), D V, 391. 
66 To Bierling (20 October 1712), D V, 389. See also A IV 4, 614/R 105; SLT 172. 
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sufficiently revealed by God.”67 Yet in this particular case at least, he does identify (some of) 
the processes involved in the posthumous distribution of rewards and punishments. He writes 
Wagner in 1710: 
 
since this [the Commonwealth of God] is governed with the utmost justice and beauty, it 
follows that, by the laws of nature themselves, souls are rendered more suited for rewards and 
punishments by the force of their own actions, on account of the parallelism between the 
Kingdom of grace and [the Kingdom of] nature. And in this sense it may be said that virtue 
brings about its own reward, and crime its own punishment, because by a sort of natural 
consequence of the very last state of the soul, according as it departs expiated or unexpiated, 
there arises a sort of natural watershed, preordained in nature by God, and consistent with 
divine promises and threats, and with grace and justice; and also with the additional 
intervention of good and bad genii, according to which side we have joined. The operations of 
these genii are undoubtedly natural, although their nature is more sublime than ours.68 
 
There are two distinct points made in this fascinating passage. First, that rewards and 
punishments are “a sort of natural consequence” of the moral status of a soul at the point of 
death. Second, that rewards and punishments may be administered by genii, that is, 
superhuman spirits such as angels and demons, whose actions (or at least those ones 
occurring without the assistance of God) would qualify as natural since genii are themselves 
part of the kingdom of nature. Let us take each of these points in turn. 
 First of all, what could Leibniz mean by a “natural watershed” between the expiated 
and unexpiated soul, that arises from “a sort of natural consequence” of its very last state? 
The most natural interpretation is that from the point of death onwards, the expiated soul 
follows a different path from the unexpiated soul, and does so as “a sort of natural 
consequence” of its state at death. The idea here recalls that worked out in some detail in a 
much earlier work, The Philosopher’s Confession (1672-1673). There Leibniz details a 
natural psychological process whereby a damned soul brings about its own punishment. The 
damned soul is one which dies discontented with the world, i.e. God’s work, and with God 
himself. This soul will carry its hatred with it into the afterlife. Between death (understood 
here as the separation of soul from body) and resurrection (the reunion of soul and body), the 
soul is disembodied, and with no sense organs to provide any new material for it to think 
                                                 
67 To Fabricius (2/12 February 1700), A I 18, 390. 
68 D II:1, 229. 
18 
 
about, its hatred of God and his work grows stronger and stronger via a process of positive 
feedback: 
 
Whoever dies malcontent dies a hater of God. And now he follows along the road on 
which he began, as if he were headed for the precipice; and not being held back by 
external things, since access to his senses has been closed off, he nourishes his soul, which 
has withdrawn into itself, with that hatred of things already begun, and with that misery 
and disdain, and with indignation, envy, and displeasure, all of them increasing more and 
more.69 
 
Unfortunately, the hatred, anger and misery of the damned person is not eased by the return 
of his body (and its senses) in the resurrection, because by that time his mind is so twisted 
that his pain is somehow pleasing to him. Consequently, after being resurrected, he will 
deliberately seek out things which incense him, and hence 
 
he endlessly finds new material for contempt, disapproval, and anger; and he is the more 
tormented the less he can change and endure the torrent of things that are displeasing to 
him.70 
 
The upshot is that his hatred of God and the world continues without end, as does the torment 
that this hatred brings. This psychological process is described in some detail in The 
Philosopher’s Confession, and there are allusions to it in some of Leibniz’s other early 
works,71 but the crucial claim that the posthumous attention of the dead is focused solely on 
their last thoughts, does not appear to have been made again after 1686.72 Although Leibniz’s 
later writings do contain numerous statements about how death affects human psychological 
activity, they are much less detailed. The following passage is representative of Leibniz’s 
later thought: 
 
In death … we do not lose life, sensation or reason, but what prevents us from noticing 
that for a time is the confusion, that is, the fact that at that time we have an infinity of little 
                                                 
69 A VI 3, 142/CP 91. 
70 A VI 3, 142/CP 91. 
71 See for example D VI, 310. 
72 See A VI, 4, 2360/SLT 204. 
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perceptions all at once, in which there is no single one which is clearly distinguished from 
the others.73 
 
On account of this confusion of perceptions, in his later writings Leibniz routinely describes 
the psychological state of the dead as being akin to a “stupor”,74 a claim not easily squared 
with there being any posthumous scrutiny of one’s own sins and moral faults. Moreover, in 
his later writings, Leibniz consistently rejects his earlier belief in temporarily-disembodied 
souls: this yields to the view that all souls, even those of angels and other genii, are always 
embodied, and hence always attached to some organs, (the “always” here should be taken to 
mean: from creation onwards).75 In his later thought, then, Leibniz rejects the very aspects of 
his earlier thought that made possible the psychological account of posthumous self-
punishment outlined in the Philosopher’s Confession, namely that souls are disembodied 
between death and resurrection, and that they have sufficient psychological activity during 
this time to dwell on their sins. Yet in spite of this, it is far from clear that the mature Leibniz 
entirely ruled out this psychological account, or at least something like it. For in an appendix 
to the Theodicy, Leibniz discusses a similar theory that had been advanced by William King 
in De origine mali, and says “These thoughts are not to be despised, and I have sometimes 
had similar ones, though I am careful not to make a decisive judgment about them.”76 It is 
possible, then, that in the Wagner letter of 1710, Leibniz’s talk of a “natural watershed” that 
arises from “a sort of natural consequence of the very last state of the soul” does hark back to 
the psychological doctrine of posthumous self-punishment developed almost forty years 
earlier, or something of that order anyway. But Leibniz does not say enough to Wagner to 
make this interpretation secure. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suppose that in the Wagner 
letter Leibniz has something rather more mundane in mind, perhaps nothing more than that it 
is the state of one’s soul at death that determines whether one is destined for rewards or 
punishments in the afterlife, with the “good” and “bad” souls thereafter following different 
paths.77 
                                                 
73 Leibniz to Queen Sophie Charlotte (1702), G VI, 522/LTS 296. 
74 G VII, 330/SLT 65; G VI, 609/LM 275. 
75 See for example “Letter on what is independent of sense and matter” (1702), G VI, 507/LTS 245; New Essays 
on Human Understanding (1703-1705), A VI 6, 221/NE 221. 
76 G VI, 436/H 441. 
77 This of course entails that one’s fate is essentially fixed by the state of one’s soul at death, such that a soul 
which is damned (for example) does not become un-damned by turning over a new leaf in the afterlife. And this 
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 But the Wagner letter does reveal one way in which rewards and punishments might 
be distributed in the future life: by genii, that is, angels and demons. That Leibniz should 
have recourse to angels and other genii to facilitate the harmony between the two kingdoms is 
fully consistent with what he says about their role elsewhere. In the Theodicy, for example, 
Leibniz claims that “God employs the ministry of angels in order to govern mankind, without 
the order of nature suffering thereby”.78 Leibniz is able to count the actions of angels as part 
of the natural order, rather than as a deviation from it, because of the sharp distinction he 
draws between the nature of created beings (that is, finite substances), and the nature of 
God.79 Those actions of created beings which are in accordance with their own natures are 
squarely part of the order of nature. This order is disturbed only by those actions of created 
beings which are beyond their own natures (for which they must be assisted by God). Leibniz 
in fact recognizes very few such actions,80 and certainly the normal actions of genii are not 
among them. Thus the normal actions of genii fall within the order of nature, and so are not 
genuinely supernatural or miraculous. 
But while Leibniz is happy to tell Wagner that angels and demons administer rewards 
and punishments, he is silent about how and when this happens. We might surmise, on the 
basis of Leibniz’s insistence that a great many rewards and punishments are deferred to the 
afterlife, that many of their rewarding and punishing operations occur at that time, though one 
should not rule out the possibility that some occur in this life also.81 After all, the idea that 
God uses “punishing angels” or “avenging angels” to punish sin in this life is found 
                                                                                                                                                        
is in fact Leibniz’s position; he says in the Theodicy: “there is always in the man who sins, even when he is 
damned, a freedom which renders him culpable, and a power, albeit remote, of recovering himself, although it 
never passes into action”. G VI, 277/H 292. 
78 G VI, 434/H 439. 
79 See for example Leibniz to Sophie (23 October/2 November 1691), A I 7, 46-47/LTS 88. 
80 His stock example of this is prophecy: genuine knowledge of future events (as opposed to a guess), requires 
knowledge of an infinity of causes, which is consistent with God’s nature but not that of humans or any other 
finite substance. Thus any genuine case of human prophecy must involve God’s inspiration or assistance, and 
thereby be straightforwardly supernatural, involving as it does actions that are beyond the natures of all finite 
substances. See Cook 2009, 269-287. 
81 One might see a problem here, in that while an angel may well be happy to carry out God’s bidding, and 
administer punishments in the interests of justice, a demon would not. Nevertheless, demons have been thought 
to torment individuals for their own reasons, which allows these torments to be considered as punishments. 
Hence Anselm supposed that humans tormented by the devil are undergoing just punishment, even though the 
devil torments out of malice, rather than justice. See Anselm 1962, I.7. 
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throughout the Old and New Testaments,82 and was widely endorsed by early modern 
thinkers (such as Malebranche).83 My own suspicion, however, is that Leibniz supposed that 
whatever punishments are meted out in this life, are done so through a different method, 
namely personal misfortunes that were calculated to occur naturally following a sinful act. 
We thus turn now to that. 
Historically, of course, it has often been thought that misfortunes in this life are often 
punishments from “on high” for one’s misdeeds, a view with which Leibniz concurred. In a 
text from the 1690s we find Leibniz posing the question “whether unfortunate outcomes 
really and truly are due to sins”,84 that is, punishments for those sins, and after much 
deliberation he finally concludes – on the basis of God’s wise government of the universe – 
that “it should be considered most certain that misfortune after wickedness is to be ascribed 
to that wickedness”.85 The misfortunes Leibniz has in mind are ones that arise not from a 
direct intervention by God (such as a lightning bolt), but rather from “some infallible 
calculation,”86 where the misfortune was arranged from the very beginning of things so that it 
would occur naturally at a morally pertinent time. We are to construe this in terms of God’s 
skilful arrangement of people, places, and events, to ensure that misfortunes follow sinful 
actions. In such cases, the misfortunes were built into the plan of the universe at the outset, to 
enable the physical and moral orders to coincide. 
Leibniz was by no means alone in holding such a view. Malebranche, in his 
Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion (1688), had earlier insisted that 
 
infinitely more wisdom is required to combine the physical and the moral in such a way that 
certain people are justly punished for their misdeeds as a consequence of the series of causes, 
than is required to punish them by means of a particular and miraculous providence.87 
 
Malebranche illustrates how the physical and the moral can come together in this way with 
the example of a villain who dies of fever; although low-key, the example shows divine 
justice working through the natural order, as opposed to divine justice intervening in and 
                                                 
82 See for example 2 Kings 19.35, 1 Chronicles 21.15, Matthew 13.49-50, Acts 12.23, and Revelation 8. 
83 See for example Malebranche 1685, 28, cf. 42-43. 
84 “Can the bad outcomes of wicked actions be ascribed to wickedness?” (1696-1697), Gr I, 372/SLT 204. 
85 Gr I, 374/SLT 207. 
86 Gr I, 373/SLT 206. 
87 Malebranche 1997a, 245 (XIII.III). 
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disrupting the natural order (which is what would happen if the villain were to be struck 
down by a lightning bolt sent from heaven).88 Leibniz himself does not offer any examples of 
this kind of orchestrated punishment, but presumably any naturally-occurring misfortune that 
follows a wicked act will suffice.89 Leibniz is at pains to stress, however, that not all 
misdeeds are followed by misfortunes, and further, that the reasons for this must be sought in 
the moral order rather than the natural order. That is, if a sinner does not experience a 
misfortune soon after the commission of a sinful act, this is because there were pressing 
moral reasons that prevented the immediacy of punishment in this case, and not because God 
was unable to arrange a misfortune through the natural order. In cases such as these – and 
there are many, Leibniz concedes – punishment is deferred to the future life (where, as we 
know, it will likely be carried out either through human psychology, or the ministry of genii). 
Nevertheless, the fact that God is prompted to orchestrate misfortunes by the sins of the 
wicked means that this form of natural punishment is squarely agential in character, since the 
sins have quite literally attracted punishment from God. 
 
4 Conclusion 
As we have covered a lot of ground, a summary of our findings would be worthwhile. As we 
have seen, Leibniz’s harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace is a compound of 
various doctrines, which may be summarized as follows: 
  
                                                 
88 Malebranche 1997a, 244 (XIII.III). 
89 It may be objected that the misfortune cannot be considered a true punishment because the person on the 
receiving end would not know (a) that it is a punishment (as opposed to plain bad luck), and (b) what it is a 
punishment for. Leibniz’s response is that punishment does not require the one being punished to know that he 
is being punished: “If we are to speak quite generally of punishment [...] there are grounds for questioning 
whether it is absolutely necessary that those who suffer should themselves eventually learn why, and whether it 
would not quite often be sufficient that those punishments should afford, to other and better informed Spirits, 
matter for glorifying divine justice.” Leibniz then continues to say “Still, it is more likely, at least in general, 
that the sufferers will learn why they suffer”, though he neglects to say when they will learn this. Consequently, 
it might only be in the afterlife that a person comes to learn that such-and-such a misfortune endured in this life 
was punishment for such-and-such a sin. See A VI 6, 246/NE 246. 
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Doctrine Details  
(HG1) The order of 
nature makes possible 
the rewards and 
punishments of 
rational souls 
All souls are naturally indestructible. 
Rational souls also naturally preserve 
their memory and personality. 
 
  Form of natural punishment 
involved 
(HG2) The rewards 
and punishments of 
rational souls are 
administered naturally 
Distancing oneself from God is its own 
punishment 
The effects of original sin were 
transmitted naturally 
The great flood occurred naturally at the 
time when morally it was required 
The great conflagration will occur 
naturally at the time when morally it is 
required 
The rewards and punishments of each 
individual human being will be 
administered naturally, namely: 
 Through normal human 
psychology (?) 
 Through the operations of genii 
 Through the skilful arrangement 
of people, places, and events, to 
ensure that misfortunes follow 
sinful actions 
Reflexive 
 
Nomic 
 
Nomic 
 
Nomic 
 
 
 
 
 
Nomic 
 
Agential 
Agential 
 
As we have seen, although the notion of the harmony between the two kingdoms only 
appears in Leibniz’s work in 1710, the doctrines it encompasses were part of his philosophy 
earlier than that: HG1 in the 1680s, and HG2 in the 1690s.90 Although it is difficult to 
                                                 
90 It is noteworthy that none of the elements of the harmony between the two kingdoms are to be found in the 
Discourse on Metaphysics of 1686. With regard to HG1, while Leibniz does state in §34 and §36 of the 
Discourse that souls are immortal, he does not indicate whether this is achieved naturally or supernaturally; 
however, it is the latter that looks to be suggested when in §35 he claims that “God will always preserve not 
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speculate on Leibniz’s reason for compounding these doctrines, it should be noted that they 
are complementary, together representing the specifically historical dimension of his 
theodicy, at least insofar as it pertains to human beings, for it is through the mechanisms 
described in these doctrines that history moves to align the moral world with the natural 
world. 
 Leibniz thus sees the harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace as 
concerned with divine justice, and indeed exclusively so, since he makes no further claims for 
this harmony; that is, he does not identify any examples of the harmony beyond those 
identified above, all of which concern divine justice. This might be thought surprising, 
inasmuch as it would mean that the harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace does 
not have anything at all to do with grace. And indeed, it is notable that when Leibniz 
discusses this harmony he does not ever discuss grace (and its distribution) in connection 
with it.91 And this is in spite of the fact that Leibniz did hold that God’s particular grace (that 
is, the grace granted to a particular individual, as opposed to his general grace, which is 
granted to all) is distributed by natural means, rather than through ad hoc divine 
interventions. To understand what is involved in this, consider an example developed by 
Malebranche, of two people, one of whom wishes to go to the opera, while the other wishes 
to hear a preacher. Now if both do as they wish, the former will encounter in the opera certain 
ideas that will ruin him, while the latter will encounter in the preacher such wisdom as to 
convert him. But as it happens, a natural event – a rain shower – intervenes, and prevents 
both from going out. Malebranche insists that this natural event may be deemed a grace by 
the first (since it prevents his ruin), and a punishment by the latter (since it prevents his 
conversion). According to Malebranche, divine providence often works this way, distributing 
its grace through natural effects, rather than through ad hoc interventions that would upset the 
order of nature.92 Leibniz promoted a similar view. In an early writing, from 1676, he 
                                                                                                                                                        
only our substance but also our person.” As for HG2, while Leibniz stresses in §34 and §36 of the Discourse 
that minds are capable of reward and punishment, he says nothing about how these are to be administered. See 
A VI 4, 1583-1587/L 325-327. 
91 Of course, some of the writings from Leibniz’s later years have yet to be published, so it is possible that there 
does exist in the Hanover archives one or more texts in which Leibniz explicitly discusses the connection 
between his doctrine of grace on the one hand, and the harmony of the kingdoms of nature and grace on the 
other. But on the basis of the work that has been published thus far, there is no reason to believe that any such 
text exists. 
92 See Malebranche 1680, 145-147. 
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suggests that grace was factored into creation right from the outset, such that direct 
interventions by God were not required for its distribution.93 This led him to construe 
particular grace as primarily a fortunate concurrence of events that cause or inspire a good 
will. To one correspondent he explains that a young woman’s visions of Christ can be 
explained naturally, being the result of her intense love of God, itself inspired by her religious 
upbringing, and are nevertheless to be considered a grace because they reinvigorate her 
piety.94 Consistent with this thought, in the Theodicy Leibniz repeatedly stresses the 
importance of one’s circumstances in determining whether one is saved or damned, and that 
finding oneself in a favorable circumstance may be considered a grace.95 As the placing of 
favored individuals in favorable circumstances could have been arranged by careful planning 
right at the outset, we can be assured that this is what God would have done; after all, a wise 
creator would choose the efficient method of grace distribution, via natural means, over the 
more profligate method, of numerous ad hoc interventions.96 Nevertheless, although this 
would seem to be a clear case of nature harmonizing with grace, Leibniz does not identify it 
as part of his harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace. Why should this be? 
 We can find no explicit answer to this in Leibniz’s writings, but the following 
observations are surely relevant. First, Leibniz is clear that the harmony in question holds 
between the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of grace, and not between nature and grace 
per se. And by “the kingdom of grace” Leibniz means only “the divine city of minds”.97 
Second, as we have noted, the harmony between the two kingdoms appears to be concerned 
exclusively with divine justice. If this is how Leibniz understood it, as seems to be the case, 
then it is not surprising that he would not mention grace in connection with it, since of course 
grace is not a matter for God’s justice: grace is, after all, neither a reward nor a punishment, 
but rather an unmerited gift. Moreover, Leibniz may not have been willing to expand the 
harmony between the two kingdoms to encompass grace and its distribution because although 
he held that God’s particular grace was distributed naturally, it also seems that he wished to 
recognize (or at least allow for) other forms of grace more supernatural in character. Nowhere 
is this clearer than in his commentary on Gilbert Burnet’s Thirty Nine Articles of the Church 
of England. In his commentary, written in 1705, Leibniz makes frequent reference to grace 
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that is distributed naturally (by individuals being placed in fortunate circumstances), but he 
also refers to “a certain special type of grace” only for the Elect,98 makes a distinction 
between “supernatural internal grace and natural and external aids”,99 refers to “single 
operation particular causes” in the matter of grace,100 and insists that “grace is brought to us 
in the natural and ordinary way and in the extraordinary and miraculous way”.101 When these 
remarks are placed alongside the rather more numerous statements about the natural 
distribution of grace, it is far from certain that Leibniz personally believed that much if any 
grace was distributed supernaturally, that is, by direct interventions from God, but it does 
seem reasonable to suppose that at the very least he wished to leave open the possibility that 
some grace was distributed that way. Consequently, if Leibniz did want to allow that some 
grace was supernatural in origin, it is not difficult to see why he would be reluctant to bring 
grace (and its distribution) within the purview of the harmony between the kingdoms of 
nature and grace, which is itself concerned with God’s moral ends being carried out by 
natural means. As such, nothing supernatural in origin can fall under this doctrine, whether 
rewards, punishments, or grace. Ultimately, then, we should not be surprised that Leibniz’s 
harmony between the two kingdoms makes no reference to grace. 
As a final thought, it is worth highlighting the fact that the belief that there is a 
harmony between the natural realm and moral realm was hardly unique to Leibniz; in fact, as 
we have seen, all of the constituent elements of Leibniz’s harmony are to be found in the 
work of one of his contemporaries, Nicolas Malebranche, though Malebranche stopped short 
of endorsing them all (specifically, he rejected the natural occurrence of the great flood and 
final conflagration). The similarity between Malebranche’s position and that later developed 
by Leibniz is striking, though claims of direct influence are likely to be overblown (due to the 
relatively broad popularity of the doctrines involved) and shall not be made here.102 Suffice it 
to say, although the package of doctrines known to us as the harmony of the kingdoms of 
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100 DNG 61. 
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102 One might also see shades of Spinoza in Leibniz’s harmony between the two kingdoms, inasmuch as the 
Dutchman likewise rejected the idea of an external system of rewards and punishments (albeit for an entirely 
different reason), and taught that virtue brings about its own reward. However, Spinoza could not have accepted 
any of the constituent elements in Leibniz’s harmony. 
27 
 
nature and grace was almost entirely foreshadowed in Malebranche, it would be wrong to 
think of it as anything other than distinctly Leibnizian.103 
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